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Abstract

Disclosure has become the preferred way of addressing the threat to researcher objectivity arising
from financial conflicts of interest (FCOIs). This article argues that the effectiveness of disclosure
at protecting science from the corrupting effects of FCOIs—particularly the kind of disclosure
mandated by US federal granting agencies—is more limited than is generally acknowledged. Current
NIH and NSF regulations require disclosed FCOIs to be reviewed, evaluated, and managed by
officials at researchers’ home institutions. However, these reviewers are likely to have institutional
and personal interests of their own that may undermine the integrity of their evaluations. This
paper presents experimental findings suggesting that such interests affect third-party assessments
of FCOIs. Over 200 participants gauged the ethical significance of various hypothetical yet realistic
FCOIs in academic research settings. Some of them were led to believe they had a small personal
interest in allowing conflicted research to proceed, whereas others’ personal outcomes were
unrelated to the conflicted research. The results show that motivated reasoning influences FCOI
evaluations, such that those with personal interest in conflicted research provided more lenient
evaluations of researcher FCOIs. These findings imply that the capacity of federally mandated
FCOI disclosure procedures to enhance bias-free science is quite restricted.
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Introduction
For some time, regulators, policy-makers, and ordinary citizens alike have been
concerned about real and perceived threats to science posed by researchers’ financial conflicts of interest (FCOIs). These concerns have been heightened both by
well-publicized recent scandals and by a growing number of collaborations
between academic scientists and for-profit entities ranging from small partnerships and start-ups to pharmaceutical corporations. As is true in professional
domains such as financial services, real estate, and medical practice, disclosure
has become the preferred way of addressing risks to integrity posed by researchers’ FCOIs (Ben-Shahar and Schneider, 2014; Loewenstein et al., 2011). FCOI
disclosure is now required by most academic journals, granting agencies, and academic institutions, and it is advocated by most disciplinary codes of ethics and
other advisory documents. In 2011, the US Public Health Service (PHS) tightened
disclosure mandates for funded scientists.
There is much to be said for disclosure as a primary response to the problem of
FCOIs. For one thing, disclosure is less restrictive than outright bans on conflicted
relationships, reapportionments of research tasks, or other more intrusive
approaches. Typically, disclosure allows conflicted projects to proceed as planned.
This serves the interests of both science and society generally, since less academic
research would be completed without private sector funding and the conflicted
relationships it often engenders (Resnik, 2010). Industrial support also benefits
those who are involved in the work. It helps researchers develop promising ideas,
provides support for student assistants, and may produce valuable intellectual
property for researchers’ institutions. Furthermore, disclosure respects individuals’ autonomy in that it allows both researchers and other affected parties to “decide
for themselves.” Such latitude reconciles the importance of clear policies with the
fact that case-by-case, FCOIs vary considerably relative to the specific relationships involved, the nature of the research, and other details. Disclosure also is
easily accomplished and cost free.
Whether it adequately addresses risks to integrity induced by researchers’ financial interests can be questioned, however. While some limitations and drawbacks
of disclosure, both inside and outside academic science, have been well documented (Elliott, 2008; Loewenstein et al., 2011; Resnik and Elliott, 2013), the
purpose of this article is to highlight a neglected facet of disclosure’s effectiveness: the likelihood that those who review others’ FCOI disclosures will be influenced by their own motivations. We present results of an experimental study
suggesting that in contexts modeling those found in PHS and National Science
Foundation (NSF) regulations, reviewers’ assessments tend to be influenced either
by their own interests or those of their institutions. Assuming these same effects
occur also in “real world” reviews—as one would expect that they would—they
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reveal a specific pathway through which conflicts of interest may corrupt assessments of research integrity. In both cases, motivated reasoning undermines, or at
least threatens, professional integrity, limiting the effectiveness of third-party disclosure assessment as a means of ensuring scientists’ objectivity.
We begin by briefly summarizing relevant literature and the procedures mandated by current US PHS and NSF disclosure policies. Next, experimental evidence of the potential influence of self-interest on disclosure reviewers is presented,
evidence based on research participant evaluations of a range of fictional but realistic and research-related scenarios. As hypothesized, reviewers’ own perceived
direct or indirect interests affect their judgments about academics’ disclosed
FCOIs. In conclusion, the implications of these results for FCOI disclosure policy
more generally are discussed. Our main point is not that disclosure is ill-advised;
certainly, it is an aspect of openness and transparency. The point, rather, is that by
itself, disclosure does less to address the problem of FCOI-related objectivity than
is often hoped for or presumed.

Background
Though FCOIs in scientific research have existed almost long as science itself,
concerns about academic researchers’ FCOIs have grown over the past several
decades. In the US, the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, together with the Federal
Technology Transfer Act of 1986 and other subsequent legislation and executive
orders (Eisenberg, 1996), have facilitated funding relationships between academic
researchers, their institutions, and industry, and these relationships have become
progressively more numerous and complex over the past three decades (Kleinman,
2010; Krimsky, 2010). Collaborations also have been spurred by declining government funding for public education and research—which universities have tried
to address partly with private research contracts (Prasad and Cifu, 2015)—and by
increased demands that universities become engines for economic development
(Bok, 2003). Meanwhile, the public has become increasingly aware of misdeeds
by academic scientists with FCOIs. Prominent recent examples include collusion
between researchers and the sugar industry in nutrition studies (O’Connor, 2016),
reports on the uses and safety of blockbuster drugs Vioxx and Paxil (Brophy, 2016;
Jureidini et al., 2008), and publications downplaying the risks of both global
warming and fracking written by academics with ties to the oil and gas industry
(Giles and Scwartz, 2015; Siegel et al., 2015).
Such examples fuel suspicions that when researchers’ personal financial interests bear significantly and directly on their work, impartial science is likely to
suffer. Though commonly discussed in terms of a “bias,” the bias metaphor is at
least potentially misleading in this context (Davis, 2012). “Bias” connotes a systematic tilt, as is found in an incorrectly calibrated scale. While individuals can
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suffer from such consistent distortions, the corrupting effects of FCOIs in academic research more typically arise in situation-specific and less predictable ways.
In part, this is because academics’ financial relationships with industrial sponsors
can take many forms: salary, stock, equity or stock options, consulting fees, honoraria, cash awards, travel, and intellectual property, including patents and copyrights. Also, financial interests can consciously or unconsciously influence
decision making at any number of points in the scientific process: problem selection, hypothesis formulation, research design, sample selection, data collection,
data analysis and interpretation, and dissemination of findings. These complexities make the problem of FCOIs in academic research resistant to a mechanical,
“one-size-fits-all” solution.
Of course, the mere fact that a scientist has a financial stake in his or her work
does not automatically entail lost objectivity. Nevertheless, considerable evidence
exists that financial interests can and often do influence research in both subtle and
not-so-subtle ways. Data analyses readily can be misleadingly subverted or distorted (Fava, 2016; Jane-wit et al., 2010; Page et al., 2013; Resnik, 2010).
“Significance chasing” or “p-hacking”—presenting statistically significant yet unhypothesized findings as having been predicted from the start—can lead to the
proliferation of Type 1 errors. A version of this technique was used by
GlaxoSmithKline as part of its deceptive marketing of Paxil (Belluz, 2015).
“Design bias,” resulting from use of inappropriate controls, selective inclusion of
variables, flawed sampling, or under-powered methodologies, is a notable concern
(Fugh-Berman, 2013; Irwin, 2009; Sismondo, 2008). It was a factor, for example,
in the misleading recent hyping of Tamiflu by Roche (Prasad and Cifu, 2015).
There is widespread evidence of the non-publication of negative results, commonly referred to as the “file-drawer” problem (Fanelli, 2012), influencing for
example the perceived efficacy of antidepressants (Turner et al., 2008). Sometimes,
fine-grained discrepancies exist between research findings and what is ultimately
reported (Vera-Badillo et al., 2013). A recent analysis found that compared with
studies not sponsored by industry, industry-sponsored studies of drugs and medical devices are more likely to report positive and beneficial findings and less likely
to show agreement between the article’s conclusion and its reported results (Lundh
et al., 2017). The fact that so many of these problems have occurred in medical and
pharmaceutical research simply reflects the fact that, at present, this where the
financial stakes are highest.
Some recent commentators have argued that concerns about scientists’ FCOIs
are exaggerated, either on grounds that the recommended cures are worse than the
disease or because such worries are caused by knee-jerk emotional reactions more
than hard data (Allison, 2009; Rosenbaum, 2015a, 2015b). Others object that such
concerns unjustly malign researchers with financial interests, since typical career
pressures and other personal interests can affect research objectivity too (Resnik,
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2007), or that the focus on FCOIs sows too much distrust (Johnsson et al., 2014).
However, these sorts of broad dismissals are increasing rare, particularly given
accumulating evidence of how unreliable much recent scientific work is proving
to be (Ioannidis, 2005, 2012). Concerns about FCOIs are also sometimes dismissed too quickly as a problem only for a “few bad apples” (Cain and Detsky,
2008). However, conflicts of interest produce motivated reasoning—reasoning
geared towards reaching a desired conclusion—for most people and in a great
variety of circumstances (Mazar and Ariely, 2015). Doctors, for instance, long
believed themselves immune to influence resulting from trivial gifts from pharmaceutical companies. The evidence is abundantly clear, however, that even small
favors and incentives affect their behavior (Brody, 2007; Dana and Loewenstein,
2003). Despite this, most researchers continue to believe that they are largely unaffected by conflicts of interest and that mere disclosure of them is ethically sufficient (Mecca et al., 2015).
On the face of it, disclosure might mitigate diminished objectivity in two ways.
First, by increasing transparency, it could help journal editors, peer reviews, and
other researchers accurately interpret and evaluate research aims, methods, and
findings, in part by ratcheting up skepticism about findings and conclusions in
conflicted reports. Second, it could make researchers less likely to enter into conflict-producing relationships in the first place, preferring simply to avoid possible
doubts about the integrity of their work. A third and distinct possibility is that
disclosure might help assuage broader social concerns about research integrity by
signaling that measures are in place to guard against corruption. The difference
between the first two and the third corresponds to a distinction Ziman draws
between “cognitive objectivity,” which involves the physical reality science
endeavors to understand, and its “social objectivity,” which depends on the public’s confidence in science’s credibility (Ziman, 2003).
These potential benefits have spurred a strong impetus towards FCOI disclosure,
beginning in the mid-1980s. Two leading academic medical journals adopted disclosure requirements at that time (Krimsky, 2010), and in 1995 both the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the NSF began requiring universities
to document and manage FCOIs. The expressed purpose of these virtually identical
regulations was to “establish standards and procedures to be followed by institutions” to promote “objectivity” by ensuring that funded research “will not be biased
by any conflicting financial interest of those investigators responsible for the
research” (DHHS, 1995; NSF, 1995). During the early 2000s, surveys of science
and medical journals showed a rapid growth in disclosure requirements (Krimsky,
2010), and scientists overwhelmingly prefer or strongly prefer disclosure to more
intrusive approaches (Lockhart et al., 2013; Weinfurt et al., 2006). In 2011, revised
DHHS regulations covering all PHS funding, including National Institutes of
Health (NIH) research grants, were put in place (DHHS, 2011).
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The key features of the current PHS regulations are worth summarizing, given
their pertinence to the findings provided below. Funded investigators must regularly disclose several kinds of “significant financial interests” (SFIs) related to
their “institutional obligations” to officials at their academic institutions. The 2011
revisions lowered SFI thresholds: researchers now must reveal any equity interests
in non-publically traded entities, any intellectual property rights, corporately
funded travel, and equity stakes worth $5000 or more in publically traded entities.
However, primary onus for collecting, reviewing, and “managing” researchers’
disclosed conflicts lies with the institutions. Crucially, institutions must determine
which if any researcher SFIs constitute bona fide “financial conflicts of interest,”
that is, financial interests “that could directly and significantly affect the design,
conduct, or reporting of the NIH-funded research” (DHHS 2011). If so, the institution must develop and put in place adequate safeguards and complete retrospective
reviews and mitigation reports in the case of researcher non-compliance. Overall,
the regulations largely defer to institutions to judge the seriousness of the threat
posed by disclosed conflicts, and institutions also are responsible for making
researchers’ disclosures publicly accessible, such as through a university-maintained website. NSF policy on FCOI disclosure varies in some details, but the
underlying mechanisms for enhancing research objectivity are largely the same. In
both cases, institutions are obligated to police themselves.
How much these regulations do to promote objectivity, their declared purpose,
is not clear. Consider first the goal of encouraging better researcher behavior.
While mandatory disclosure sometimes leads people to avoid conflicts, conflict
avoidance is a function of how avoidable the conflicts are (Sah and Loewenstein,
2014). In many academic research contexts, projects simply would be impossible
without industrial involvement. Also, mandatory disclosure has been shown to
encourage worse behavior. So-called “moral licensing” occurs because having fulfilled their disclosure obligations, individuals sometimes take ethical liberties
elsewhere (Cain et al., 2011; Effron and Conway, 2015). In effect, disclosure enables conflicted individuals to displace their ethical responsibilities onto others’
shoulders, having already supplied evidence of their own moral credentials (Brown
et al., 2011). In addition, compared with physicians or financial advisors, researchers are especially susceptible to the “identifiability effect” (Sah, 2012). People are
less conscientious regarding their conflicts of interest when they perceive greater
psychological distance from those who might be adversely affected by their
actions. Obviously, researchers are often far removed from those most likely to
suffer from their flawed work.
Neither is disclosure likely to be as useful to reviewers as one might suppose.
Findings from other professional domains are instructive. Research regarding
FCOI disclosures by physicians finds that while transparency makes some patients
trust them less, it makes others trust physicians more (Weinfurt et al., 2008),
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presumably because it is taken as a sign of their trustworthiness. Another study
showed that while medical journal peer reviewers reported increased general skepticism about conflicted research, ultimately their assessments of individual manuscripts were usually unchanged by disclosure (Lippert et al., 2011). Similarly, a
study of the likelihood of prescribing a drug based on the results of a hypothetical
trial concluded that FCOI disclosures had little impact on physician’s self-reported
behavior. While disclosures induced skepticism towards conflicted research when
directly compared with non-conflicted work, this skepticism was not produced by
conflicted research evaluated in isolation (Silverman et al., 2010). Consider also
substantial evidence documenting the poor reliability of peer review in general.
Studies have shown low inter-rater reliability, whether reviewers are evaluating
journal manuscripts (Bornmann et al., 2010) or grant applications (Marsh et al.,
2008; Mutz et al., 2012), particularly when reported findings are contrary to the
reviewer’s theoretical perspective (Mahoney, 1977).
In fact, two factors make discerning, objective review of researchers’ FCOI
disclosures difficult. The first, alluded to above, is the awkwardness of outsider
review of research (Sax and Doran, 2011). Administrative officials, even those
with a background in science, may lack the specific disciplinary expertise needed
to question a specialists’ judgment. Researchers from nearby areas of inquiry at
the same institution likewise may feel uncomfortable appearing to doubt a peer’s
approach. Not wanting to appear distrustful, it is easier simply to defer. In other
contexts, disclosure has been demonstrated to produce compliance with conflicted
advice (Sah et al., 2013).
The second problem, arguably more insidious and pervasive than the first, is
motivated reasoning. Much as a scientist with a financial conflict of interest in the
work has two competing motivations, a similar dynamic faces those who must
review disclosures from researchers at their institutions. Allowing the work to
proceed with minimal interference will in many cases best serve the interests of
the institution and will please those who want the work to proceed. Reasons for
caution, on the other hand, often will be cognitively indeterminate and ethically
malleable. Situations such as this enable people to act as “motivated Bayesians,”
doing what serves their interests while acting conscientiously enough to feel good
about their own ethicality (Gino et al., 2016). After all, switching back-and-forth
between dual roles is cognitively difficult (Moore et al., 2010); it is hard to be an
impartial and neutral practitioner in one respect while being partisan advocate in
another. People typically believe they are being objective, but what they desire to
be true shapes their interpretation of scientific evidence even more than their initial beliefs (Bastardi et al., 2011).
Once again, analogous circumstances to FCOI disclosure evaluation provide
plentiful supporting evidence. As Saver has argued persuasively regarding
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), the pressure to conform ethical evaluations to
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social and institutional pressures can be difficult to resist, particularly when few
incentives favor skepticism (Saver, 2004). Also, in evaluating conflict of interest
policies, physicians viewed proposed conflict of interest policies in medical settings more critically and less favorably than nearly identical policies applied to
financial investments; the attitudes of financial planners were the reverse.
Professionals’ biases tend to mirror those of the institutions they serve (Sharek
et al., 2008: 377). So too for lawyers, who are swayed by their own financial interests when advising clients (Moore et al., 2005). External auditors hired to evaluate
the integrity of corporations’ book-keeping tend to shade to their audits; those they
audit pay for their work (Moore et al., 2006). Likewise, corporate boards often are
reluctant to check CEOs’ FCOIs aggressively (Lin, 1996). As noted above, such
influences often operate without conscious awareness of those affected by them
and without intentional compromise of their judgment (Chugh, 2005). Those benefited by their skewed judgment tend to be close-by and familiar, while those
potentially hurt by it are unknown and remote.
All of these strands of evidence suggest that that neutral evaluation of others’
disclosed FCOIs is not easy, and that the sort of institutionally based third-party
review mandated by federal granting agencies is likely to be affected by motivated
reasoning. The next section presents experimental evidence in support of this
conclusion.

Methodology
Materials and procedure
After first securing IRB approval, study participation was solicited though the
university’s online experiment portal (SONA Research Systems). In total, 229
undergraduate students volunteered in exchange for partial course credit (189
women, 37 men, three undisclosed gender; Mean age: 21.41 years, SD = 5.50
years). After giving informed consent, participants read a standard definition of
financial conflict of interest:
A financial conflict of interest is a situation in which someone’s work-related obligations or
professional responsibilities potentially conflict with his or her personal financial interests.
Financial conflicts of interest raise questions about possible bias, and they can exist even when
no one has done anything wrong.

To simulate the self-interest of institutional FCOI reviewers, study participants
then were given a fictional statement about a new federal initiative. The statement
claimed that states were to begin receiving fixed-sum supplements to academic
research funding already received at their institutions from federal grants or private industry sponsors (see Appendix). Ultimately, supplemental funds were to be
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distributed to funded scientists and to students in the form of tuition rebates, but
the total disbursable share available at each institution depended on the portion of
the state’s research dollars garnered by members of that institution’s faculty.
Research funds received by researchers at one institution increased the supplemental share available to that institution’s researchers and students and reduced
the amount available to the rest of the state. The ruse was designed to encourage
participants to think they could benefit in a small yet direct way by allowing conflicted research at their institution to proceed.
Participants then assessed 10 scenarios presented in randomized order in which
academic researchers from various disciplines had FCOIs (see Appendix). They
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions on a between-participants basis:
2 (disclosure, non-disclosure) × 2 (own university, competitor university). Each
scenario involved a researcher who either did or did not appropriately disclose an
FCOI and was from either the participants’ home university or an in-state competitor. Participants then were asked to answer four questions about each vignette, the
first three, presented in randomized order, using Likert scales: “To what extent is
this situation a financial conflict of interest (1 = not at all a financial conflict of
interest; 7 = very much a financial conflict of interest)?” “To what extent is this
situation unethical (1 = not at all unethical; 7 = very much unethical)?” “To what
extent is this situation likely to affect the researcher’s objectivity (1 = not at all
likely; 7 = very likely)?” In the fourth question, participants were asked what the
researcher in each situation should do: Continue the research activity AND continue the financial relationship with the external entity; End the relationship with
the external entity BUT continue the research activity; or Discontinue the research
activity BUT continue financial relationship with external entity. Importantly, the
first option would provide the most favorable outcome not only for the researcher,
but also for the third party (i.e., participants) should they provide a favorable evaluation of the potential researcher FCOI, specifically when that research was to be
conducted at the participants’ own institution.
After assessing the scenarios, participants provided brief demographic information (e.g., age, gender) and were redirected to an online debriefing form.

Results
Perceptions of FCOI, ethicality, and objectivity based on affiliation
and disclosure
Because FCOI (α = .83), ethicality (α = .81), and objectivity (α = .82) perceptions
were reliable across scenarios, we averaged participants’ responses to create a composite of perceptions of FCOIs, ethicality, and objectivity, where higher scores
reflect greater perceptions that the situations represented a significant FCOI, would
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be of greater ethical concern, and would be a greater threat to researcher objectivity,
respectively. We then conducted three separate 2 disclosure (disclosure, non-disclosure) × 2 affiliation (own university, competitor universities) between-subjects
ANOVAs for perceptions of FCOI, ethicality, and objectivity, respectively.
For FCOI perceptions, the only significant effect to emerge was a main effect of
disclosure, F(1,225) = 10.51, p = .001, ηp2 = .045, such that participants in the nondisclosure condition indicated that the situations were more of an FCOI (M = 4.54,
SD = 1.21) than participants in the disclosure condition (M = 4.04, SD = 1.10).
There was no main effect of researchers’ institutional affiliations, nor an interaction between affiliation and disclosure (ps > .68).
Regarding ethicality of the situations themselves, again the only significant effect
to emerge was a main effect of disclosure, F(1,225) = 19.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .081,
such that participants in the non-disclosure condition indicated that the situations
were more unethical (M = 4.45, SD = 1.14) than participants in the disclosure condition (M = 3.83, SD = .95). There was no main effect of researchers’ institutional
affiliations, nor an interaction between affiliation and disclosure (ps > .36).
For assessments of whether the researchers’ objectivity was likely to be affected,
the only significant effect to emerge was a main effect of disclosure, F(1,225) =
10.85, p = .001, ηp2 = .046, such that participants in the non-disclosure condition
indicated that the situation was more likely to affect ethicality (M = 4.66, SD =
1.09) than participants in the disclosure condition (M = 4.20, SD = 1.01). There
was no main effect of researchers’ institutional affiliations, nor an interaction
between affiliation and disclosure (ps > .22).
Thus, regardless of whether the researcher was affiliated with one’s own institution or not, participants reported that researchers with undisclosed rather than disclosed financial relationships had more of an FCOI, were in less ethical situations,
and a situation more likely to affect the researchers’ objectivity.

Decisions regarding researcher conduct
In order to determine if there were differences in participants’ recommendations as
to what the researchers should do, we divided the frequency with which participants made each type of decision and divided that by the total number of scenarios.
This yielded a percentage for each decision type, ranging from 0% to 100%. We
then conducted a 2 affiliation (participants’ university, competitor university) × 2
disclosure (FCOI disclosed, FCOI undisclosed) × 3 decision (continue both, continue research only, continue financial relationship only) mixed-model ANOVA,
with repeated measures over the last factor. This analysis yielded a main effect of
decision, F(2,450) = 45.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .170; post hoc tests revealed that to an
equal degree, participants thought that the researcher should continue both the
research and the financial relationship (M = .40, SD = .22) or continue the research
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only (M = .39, SD = .22) as compared with the option of continuing only the financial relationship (M = .21, SD = .16; ps < .001, ds > .93). There was no significant
difference in participants’ preference for the researcher to continue both the
research and financial relationship or to continue only the research (p = .584, d =
.05). These findings are sensible. Whereas the first and second options have a collective benefit, either to the researcher and participant or the researcher and society, the third option really only benefits the researcher. Thus, participants were
sensitive to these different benefits, selecting options one and two equivalently
and more frequently than option three.
Importantly, this analysis also yielded an interaction between affiliation and
decision, F(2,450) = 4.01, p = .019, ηp2 = .018. To better interpret this interaction,
we conducted independent samples t-tests to compare decisions across the university affiliations. Participants were more likely to recommend that a researcher
described as from their own institution should continue both the research and the
financial relationship (M = .44, SD = .22) than if the researcher was from a competitor institution (M = .36, SD = .21), t(227) = 2.52, p = .012, d = .33. Participants
were equally likely to report that a researcher should continue the research while
severing the financial relationship, regardless of whether the researcher was
described as from their own institution (M = .38, SD = .21) or a competitor institution (M = .39, SD = .22), t(227) = –.48, p = .634, d = .06. Participants were more
likely to recommend that a researcher at a competitor institution should continue
only the financial relationship (M = .23, SD = .17) than if the researcher was at
their own institution (M = .18, SD = .14), t(227) = –2.49, p = .013, d = .33. These
findings are consistent with motivated reasoning, such that evaluations of FCOIs
are more favorable when participants have something to gain personally from the
relationship.
There was also an interaction between disclosure and decision, F(2,450) = 5.44,
p = .005, ηp2 = .024. To better interpret this interaction, we conducted independent
samples t-tests to compare type of decision across disclosure condition. Participants
were more likely to indicate that the researcher should continue both the research
and the financial relationship in the disclosure condition (M = .44, SD = .21) compared with the non-disclosure condition (M = .36, SD = .22), t(227) = 3.02, p =
.003, d = .40. Participants were marginally more likely to report that the researcher
should continue the research while severing ties with external supporters in the
non-disclosure condition (M = .41, SD = .23) compared with the disclosure condition (M = .36, SD = .20), t(227) = -1.84, p = .067, d = .24. Participants were equally
likely to indicate that researchers should continue the financial relationship while
terminating the research in the disclosure (M = .19, SD = .16) and non-disclosure
conditions (M = .22, SD = .16), t(227) = 1.38, p = .169, d = .18.
There was not a significant three-way interaction between affiliation, disclosure, and decision (p = .462), and no other significant effects emerged from
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this analysis (all ps > .100). The lack of a three-way interaction indicates that
the impact of disclosure and university affiliation may be independent of one
another. Thus, participants reported that researchers should continue both the
research and the financial relationship only if they have disclosed their FCOIs
and continue the research while severing the external financial tie if their
FCOIs had not been disclosed. However, participants believed it was more
appropriate for researchers with FCOIs to maintain the financial ties while
continuing the research activity if researchers were at their own institution
compared with competitor institutions; however, they were more likely to indicate that researchers at competitor institutions should continue only the financial relationship while discontinuing the research compared with researchers
at their own institution.
Thus, it appears that individuals are sensitive to the potential problems of
FCOIs, regardless of whether it is a researcher at their own institution or a competitor institution. However, they are more willing to give a researcher the benefit
of the doubt, so to speak, when researchers are from their own institution, as was
reflected in greater support for researchers continuing both the research and the
financial relationship. This latter situation is the most beneficial to participants
themselves based on the cover story they received, because according to the ruse
they had been told, the more money researchers obtained at their own institution,
the greater the tuition rebate they could receive. Conversely, the more money
researchers obtained at competitor institutions, the less available for them. The
dynamic was zero sum. The upshot is that while participants are very sensitive to
the problems associated with FCOIs, they are more inclined to overlook the
impact of those problems if doing so benefits themselves.

Discussion and conclusion
In light of evidence presented above about motivated reasoning and difficulties
associated with FCOI evaluation, these findings are perhaps not surprising.
However, they support a point not previously studied experimentally: the impact
of self-interest on FCOI disclosure assessment. Given the responsibility federal
regulations place on institutions to review FCOI disclosures from their own
researchers, and the institutional interests typically at stake in disclosure review
contexts, these findings are thus significant.
Finding meaningful and realistic ways of improving the effectiveness of mandated disclosure is not easy, however. Of course, problems resulting from FCOIinduced incentives in research are remedied most thoroughly by removing the
conflicts that give rise to them. However, this is not likely to occur, and neither is
it clearly desirable. In an era in which public budgets are increasingly under pressure, it is unlikely that public support is forthcoming to allow significant limits to
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industrial involvement in academic research. For example, resources available for
NIH funding have declined 25% since 2003, adjusting for inflation (Alberts et al.,
2014). Another unlikely change is a significant alteration in the way institutions
and science itself encourages and even valorizes different kinds of behavior. As is
true in other professional domains, the rewards for sticking up for what is ethical
and honest in the face of temptations and pressures to do otherwise are not what
they should be. Institutional climate, including the way those in positions of power
are expected to react, has an disproportionate impact on individual decision making (Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009; van Gils et al., 2017).
Two more practicable reforms are worth mentioning. One idea, which has
advocates in some medical research contexts, is a kind of centralized repository
of FCOI disclosures (Dunn et al., 2016). Concurrent with grant applications, for
example, or journal article submissions, researchers could be expected to register their conflicts of interest in a sort of global database. Though many details
in such a system would remain to be worked out, it would have two notable
advantages lacking in the current, highly fragmented, approach. First, it offers
the possibility of a standardized approach to what counts as an FCOI. Little
uniformity presently exists, for example, in the way journals define or report
FCOIs. Second, global availability of FCOI disclosures would at least partially
diffuse the current emphasis on local, institutional review. A second reform is a
more whole-hearted embrace of the kinds of reforms currently advocated by the
Open Science Network (Miguel et al., 2014). Pre-registering research studies of
all kinds, not just large-scale clinical trials, as is now the case, could go a long
way towards reducing some of the more flagrant research abuses.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that tensions between financial
interests and the norms of good science can perhaps never be smoothed over
entirely. However, it is important to understand that while far from pointless, the
effectiveness of disclosure at enhancing research objectivity is more limited than
is often recognized.
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